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The seaborne steam coal market changed in recent years. Trade volumes grew dynamically, 
important  players  emerged  and  since  2007  prices  increased  significantly  and  remained 
relatively high since then. In this paper we analyse market equilibria in the years 2006 and 
2008 by testing for two possible market structure scenarios in this market: perfect competition 
and an oligopoly setup with major exporters competing in quantities. We conclude from our 
results that international steam coal trade is not perfectly competitive as there is a large spread 
between marginal costs and prices and a low capacity utilisation in 2008. Further, trade flows 
are generally more diversified in reality than in the competitive scenario. However, also the 
Cournot scenarios fail to accurately explain real market outcomes. We conclude that only 
more sophisticated models of strategic behaviour can predict market equilibria in international 
steam coal trade. 
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1. Introduction 
Behind oil but before natural gas, coal is the second most important primary energy source. It 
is  mainly  used  for  electricity  and  heat  generation.  About  36%  of  the  global  electricity 
generation  is  based  on  hard  coal.
1  Although  most  of  the  coal  is  produced  and  consumed 
domestically, international steam coal trade is on the rise.
2 However, price volatility increased 
too and the years 2007 and 2008 both saw unprecedented price spikes. Steam coal prices in 
North Western Europe reached a maximum of 210 USD/t in mid-2008 and averaged 147 
USD/t for the whole year. This is more than 130% above the average price of 64 USD/t in 
2006.
3 Prices decreased with the financial crisis in the second half of 2008 but remained on 
relatively high levels through 2009 and 2010.
4  
These price increases on the spot markets for internationally traded coal in recent years were 
paralleled by significant structural changes on the demand and the supply side. During the last 
decade  demand  increased  dynamically  and  total  trade  volume  grew  by  more  than  60% 
between 2000 and 2009 on the seaborne market. This development is mainly caused by a 
strong growth of energy demand in Asian economies. Recently, India and South East Asian 
economies have become major importers in the Pacific market. Moreover, China a major net 
exporter at the beginning of the last decade has drastically increased imports since 2005. 
The supply side is dominated by countries with a mainly export oriented mining industry like 
South Africa, Australia, Indonesia and Colombia. The latter two are relatively new players on 
this market which expanded their supply capacity quickly during the last decade. Moreover, in 
some countries the government has put its focus on developing national coal strategies in the 
last years, often tightening their control of coal exports, for instance in China or Indonesia.
5 
Due to governmental control in some countries or the influence of large company consortia 
and industry associations in other countries, steam coal supply tends to be aggregated on a 
national level rather than on a firm level. 
Given the growing importance of several new suppliers, the emergence of national energy and 
coal strategies in several countries and the dramatic recent steam coal price evolutions we test 
if market structures in 2006 and 2008 can be described either by a competitive setup or an 
                                                 
1 See IEA (2010b). Data for 2008. 
2 The classification of hard coal (distinct from lignite) comprises steam coal and coking coal. Steam coal (or 
thermal coal) is mainly used in electricity generation whereas coking coal is used for  metallurgical purposes. 
3 See Ritschel (2009). 
4 The Asian marker (North Western European marker) was 79 USD/t (70 USD/t) in 2009 and 105 USD/t (92 
USD/t) in 2010. 
5 China constantly reduced export licenses (from 80 mt in 2005 to less than 20 mt in 2011). Further, the Chinese 
government started a programme to restructure and consolidate the coal mining industry (Peng 2010). In 
Indonesia only Indonesian companies or consortia are eligible for mining concessions (Baruya 2009). 3 
 
oligopolistic setup. To do so, we develop an optimisation model for computing spatial market 
equilibria  in  competitive  and  oligopolistic  international  trade  markets.  The  equilibrium 
modelling approach was introduced by Samuelson (1952) with his work on the programming 
of  competitive  equilibria  in  spatial  markets,  and  generalised  for  various  non-competitive 
market structure scenarios e.g. by Takayama and Judge (1964, 1971), Harker (1984, 1986) 
and Yang et al. (2002). The model is implemented as a mixed complementarity programme 
(MCP) with the software GAMS and based on a unique coal market dataset of EWI. This 
dataset comprises inter alia supply capacities and costs including time dependent supply cost 
functions based on input price evolutions to account for recent supply cost increases. 
We find that actual prices in 2006 are in line with the competitive benchmark in Europe but 
prices in Asian importing regions exceed marginal costs. In 2008, prices and volumes are not 
consistent with the competitive benchmark. Furthermore, trade flows are more diversified in 
the real market than in the competitive scenario. However, also for both years, actual prices 
were lower than the oligopolistic prediction. Generally, the results indicate that competitive 
models  are  not  able  to  fully  reproduce  coal  market  equilibria,  particularly  in  2008.  This 
suggests that the degree of competition may recently have decreased in the coal trade market. 
Literature on market conduct in international steam coal trade is relatively scarce. Abbey and 
Kolstad (1983) present a qualitative analysis of the potentials to exert market power in steam 
coal  trade.  Kolstad  and  Abbey  (1984)  were  the  first  to  quantitatively  analyse  strategic 
behaviour in international steam coal trade in the early 1980s using an MCP model. Besides 
perfect competition they model various imperfect market structures. The authors find that a 
non-competitive market structure consisting of a duopoly  and a monopsony simulates the 
actual  trade  patterns  well.  However,  since  then  the  steam  coal  trade  market  has  changed 
substantially. We follow the approach of Kolstad and Abbey (1984) by using an MCP model 
and  update  their  research  with  recent  data.  The  paper  most  closely  related  to  ours  is 
Haftendorn and Holz (2010). They model a number of major seaborne coal trade routes and 
apply a mixed complementarity model to test if trade volumes on these routes fit competitive 
or Cournot-Nash behaviour in the years 2005 and 2006. They conclude from their results that 
the steam coal trade market is better represented by perfect competition.  
We  add  to  their  analysis  three  important  aspects.  First,  while  their  research  focuses  on 
selected major trade routes, we extend the analysis to cover the full seaborne steam coal trade 
market. Second, we use a different database and generalise the model for multi-plant players 
to account for cost-differences in mining regions and mining technologies. It is reassuring that 
for 2006 we find, in an independent approach, qualitatively similar results as Haftendorn and 4 
 
Holz (2010). Third, and most important, by extending the time considered up to 2008, we are 
able  to  detect  a  change  in  market  structure  from  competitive  outcomes  in  2006  to  non-
competitive outcomes in 2008. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: First, we will briefly outline the current 
situation on the seaborne steam coal trade market. Section three proceeds with a detailed 
description of the model and its properties. Then, in section four the supply and demand side 
data input is described. The scenario design is outlined in section five. Section six presents the 
model results and finally, section seven concludes the paper. 
 
2. The seaborne steam coal trade market 
The majority of steam coals are not traded internationally but are produced and consumed in 
domestic markets. In 2008 total global hard coal production was 5850 mt.
6 The two largest 
domestic  markets  are  China  and  the  USA  together  comprising  more  than  65%  of  total 
production. About 13% of the global steam coal production is traded internationally and more 
than 90% of international steam coal trade is seaborne. In this submarket two different types 
of suppliers interact with each other: Countries that have a dedicated export-oriented mining 
industry  and  countries  with  chiefly  inland-oriented  mining  industries.
  7  The  former  type 
primarily comprises South Africa, Colombia, Australia and Indonesia and holds most of the 
supply capacity for the international trade market. These export industries usually have a cost 
advantage  over  domestic  industries  due  to  good  coal  qualities,  low  mining  costs  and 
economical  access  to  transport  infrastructure.  The  latter  type  primarily  consists  of  China, 
USA  and  Russia.  These  countries  have  some  dedicated  export  collieries  but  most  of  the 
potential export capacity can serve both the national and the international market. Depending 
on  the  relation  of  export  prices  to  domestic  prices  these  mines  supply  either  domestic 
consumers or maritime trade markets (swing suppliers). The majority of domestic mines are 
always  extramarginal  on  international  markets  due  to  low  coal  quality,  contractual 
obligations, high supply costs or the lack of access to infrastructure. 
The seaborne trade market can be divided into a Pacific and an Atlantic market region.
8 Major 
importing regions in the Atlantic market are the USA and Europe (including neighbouring 
Mediterranean countries) with the United Kingdom and Germany at the top. Traditionally 
these importing regions are primarily supplied by South Africa, Colombia and Russia.  
                                                 
6 See Ritschel (2009), includes coking coal. 
7 See e.g. Kopal (2007) or Rademacher (2008). 
8 During the last decade trade flows between the two regions grew considerably and recent research has pointed 
out that the global steam coal market is well integrated (see e.g. Warrell (2006) or Li (2008)). Nevertheless we 
use these terms in this paper in a geographical sense to better structure our analysis. 5 
 
The Pacific market has grown more dynamically in recent years. High quantities are imported 
by Japan, South Korea and Taiwan – all three of them having virtually no indigenous coal 
production and therefore heavily rely on imports. However, most of the growth has come 
from emerging import regions like  India, South East Asia  and China.  The supply  side is 
dominated  by  Australia  and  Indonesia  although  the  sustained  high  prices  in  Asia  have 
attracted increasing spot volumes from South Africa and very recently also from Colombia. 
 
3. Model Description 
We  develop  a  spatial  equilibrium  model  for  the  seaborne  steam  coal  market  in  which 
exporters  and  importers  trade  with  each  other.  Coal  exporters  control  one  or  more  coal 
production regions (including the infrastructure) and coal importers are assigned to demand 
regions. These players trade steam coal with each other via bulk carrier shipping routes. It is 
assumed that the exporters’ objective is to maximise their respective profits. Importers are 
assumed  to  act  as  price  takers.  The  optimisation  model  is  formulated  as  a  mixed 
complementary problem (MCP) by deriving the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. In 
equilibrium,  the  set  of  prices  and  quantities  simultaneously  satisfies  all  maximisation 
conditions.  
The model consists of a network NW(N,A), where N is a set of nodes and A is set of arcs 
between the nodes. The set of nodes N can be divided into two subsets  I E N È º , where 
E iÎ  is an export region and  I jÎ  is a demand node. Players  Z zÎ control export regions 
z E iÎ . Export regions can only be controlled by one player  Æ º Î z Z z E I . The set of arcs 
I E A z ´ º consists of arcs  ) , ( j z f . Table 1 gives an overview over demand regions, export 
regions and the corresponding players as modelled in this paper.
9   
 
                                                 
9 The model export nodes cover about 98% of real market exports. The remaining 2% of exports is divided 
among the model regions according to their share of total production. Import side coverage is about 95%. The 
import balance is divided among the import regions according to their share of total imports.  6 
 
Table 1: Model regions 
 
 
Mining costs, average inland transport costs and port terminal costs add up to a quadratic 
FOB (free-on-board) supply function
10 depending on the produced quantity  i q  per export 
node  ) ( i i q S . Seaborne transport costs  j z, t per unit  j z x ,  shipped. However, the transport cost 
parameter  ) ( , zj j z d t  depends on the distance  zj d  between z and j. Individual transport cost 
functions  were  calculated  for  every  year  based  on  historical  data.
11  Import  demand  is 
represented by a linear function of the form: 
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(1) 
Where  j p  denotes the price in region j subject to the imported quantity. The parameter  j a  
denotes the reservation price and the parameter  j b  specifies the slope of the demand function. 
Production costs  i W  in node  E iÎ  correspond to the integral under the quadratic FOB (free-
on-board) supply function: 
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10 Quadratic marginal functions had the best fit when regressed against a dataset of mining costs. Further, 
quadratic marginal cost functions capture important characteristics of steam coal supply e.g. an increasing 
increment of marginal costs the more capacity is utilized. 
11 Bulk carrier freight data were provided by McCloskey Coal Information, Frachtkontor Junge & Co, and Baltic 
Exchange. See section 4.2 for a detailed description of transport cost data. 
Exporting regions Corresponding players Demand regions
New South Wales/open cast Australia Europe (including Mediterranean)
New South Wales/underground Australia Japan
Queensland/open cast Australia South Korea
Queensland/underground Australia Taiwan
Mpumalanga/open cast South Africa China
Mpumalanga/underground South Africa India
Kalimantan & Sumatra Indonesia Latin America 
Kuzbass & Donbass Russia North America 









The amount of coal supplied by player  Z zÎ  to region  I jÎ   is defined as  j z x , , let us define 
j z x ,
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Producer z’s profit maximisation problem  z W consists of the objective function Fz and the 
constraints (5) – (7): 
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,
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Subject to: 
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0 ³ i q   (7) 
Restriction (5) states that production in  E iÎ  has to be at least as high as total exports. The 
second restriction (6) ensures that production in  E iÎ  does not exceed the available capacity 
i C . The strictly quasi-concave objective function (4) and the convex restrictions (5)-(7) form 
an optimisation problem, which has a unique solution. The first order optimality conditions 
are thus necessary and sufficient for deriving a unique optimum if the set of feasible solutions 
is non-empty. The equilibrium conditions are derived using the first order derivatives of the 
Lagrangian of  z W   (KKT conditions). The Lagrangian multipliers  z m  and  i g  are shadow 
prices for player  Z zÎ  and in region  E iÎ respectively. The variable  z m  represents the value 
of  a  marginal  unit  of  exports  whereas  i g corresponds  to  the  value  of  a  marginal  unit  of 
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The derivative  j z j z j z j z j j z j x x x x p x p , , , , , ) ~ ~ ( × ¶ ¶ × ¶ ¶ + ¶ ¶  in (8) expresses player z’s ability to 
influence the market price in  I jÎ  by strategically choosing the amount of coal supplied, 8 
 
subject  to  his  conjecture  of  the  other  producers‘  reaction.  In  the  case  of  a  Cournot-Nash 
oligopoly,  0 ~
, , = ¶ ¶ j z j z x x   holds  and  KKT-condition  (8)  simplifies  to  (8a)  under  the 
assumption of a linear demand function. In a competitve market, however, a change of player 
z’s supply will be fully offset by the other producers and therefore  1 ~
, , - = ¶ ¶ j z j z x x  holds. In 
the case of perfect competition and for fringe suppliers condition (8) simplifies to (8b). 
0 0 2 , , , ³ ^ ³ + × - - j z z j z j j j z x x b a m t   (8a) 
0 0 , , , ³ ^ ³ + × - - j z z j z j j j z x x b a m t   (8b) 
Equation (1), the first order conditions (8) and (9) as well as capacity constraints (10) and (11) 
for all players  Z zÎ together constitute the optimisation problem. The unique solution for this 
set of inequalities yields the equilibrium for this market. This mixed complementary problem 





The database used in this analysis stems from several extensive research projects conducted at 
the Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne. Steam coal market data has 
been acquired from a multitude of different and potentially heterogeneous sources. Although 
steam coal market data seems scarce at a first glance, various institutions, researchers, experts 
and  companies  have  published  useful  information.  General  steam  coal  market  data  is  for 
example published by institutions like IEA and EIA.
13 Detailed data on supply chain costs, 
steam coal demand and production of major players are available from the IEA Clean Coal 
Centre.
14  Further  publications  include  analyses  from  employees  working  for  international 
utilities and coal industry newsletters.
15 National statistics bureaus and ministries concerned 
with minerals, energy and resources provide detailed information.
16 Furthermore, company 
annual reports and presentations related to the steam coal market have been evaluated and 




                                                 
12 See Rutherford (1994) or Ferris and Munson (1998) for detailed information on complementary programming 
in GAMS. 
13 See IEA (2009) and IEA (2010a), EIA (2009) and EIA (2010). 
14 See Baruya (2007, 2009), Minchener (2004, 2007) and Crocker/Kowalchuk (2008). 
15 See e.g. Kopal (2007), Rademacher (2008), Bayer et al. (2009) and Ritschel/Schiffer (2005, 2007). The 
McCloskey Coal  Report is regularly reviewed. 
16 Notable examples are ABARE, US Geological Survey, Bundesanstalt für Geowissenschaften und Rohstoffe, 
Australian Bureau of Statistics, DANE, BLS and Statistics South Africa. 9 
 
4.1 Mining costs and export capacity 
Costs for mining consist of overburden removal and extraction costs, processing and washing 
costs as well as transportation costs within the colliery. The data on mining costs is based on 
expert interviews and the evaluation of annual reports and literature sources  as described 
above. Since this data stems from heterogeneous sources and is mostly based on cost ranges 
and mining costs of representative mines we regard our data only as a proxy for real mining 
costs. The lack of data on some mines might cause distortions if we would model every single 
mine explicitly. Therefore we fit the available data of mine mouth cash costs and mining 
capacity to a quadratic marginal cost function by ordinary least squares. This method yields a 
supply curve that comprises the main characteristics and cost levels of each mining region. 
Figure 1 gives an example of Colombian mining costs and the approximated marginal cost 
function. As coal qualities vary between the mining regions, calorific values are generally 
adjusted to 25.1 MJ/kg using data from Ritschel (2010), BGR (2009) and IEA (2009). 
 
Figure 1: Example of FOB costs for Colombia and approximation of marginal cost function for 2006 
 
Source: EWI coal market database 
 
These  supply  curves  are  complemented  by  country  and  technology  specific  mining  cost 
structures  and  escalated  using  input  price  data.  These  cost  structures  are  derived  from  a 
number of sources. Detailed information for Australian open cast and underground mines is 
found  in  ABS  (2006).  Meister  (2008),  Baruya  (2007)  and  Ritschel/Schiffer  (2007)  for 
instance  provide  information  on  cost  structures  on  a  global  scale.  Longwalling  and 




































operations rely either on draglines or truck/shovel or a mix of both technologies. The cost 
structures indicate how much diesel fuel, steel, explosives, tyres, chemicals, electricity and 
labour  is  used  per  technology.  The  proportions  of  these  commodities  vary  significantly 
between the four predominant extraction technologies dragline, truck/shovel, longwalling and 
room/pillar (see table 2). Labour costs are one of the factors that typically differ between the 
coal producing countries. While salaries are low in countries like South Africa or Indonesia 
they are considerably higher in the USA or Australia.  
 
Table 2: Input factors and relative importance in coal mining in 2006 
 
Source: ABS (2006), Meister (2008), own database, see also Paulus and Trüby (2010) 
 
The mining cost curves are escalated according to the cost structures using price index data 
for  the  above  mentioned  commodities  from  various  statistical  offices.  Furthermore, 
productivity  figures  and  country  specific  exposures  to  fluctuations  of  exchange  rates  are 
included. This method yields the shifts in supply curves for the period 2006-2008.  
Generally, coal supply costs increased world-wide during 2006 and 2008 due to input price 
escalation. Table 3 presents an overview of the cost increases for the model mining regions. 
Clearly, mining cost escalation affected producers differently. Major exporters with a large 
share of open cast production like Indonesia or Colombia generally experienced higher cost 
increases. Producers with a high proportion of underground mines like the U.S., South Africa 
or Australia were less affected. This is due to the different cost structures of underground 
mining operations. Underground mining technologies rely to a larger proportion on labour 
costs  and  electricity  prices  and  other  locally  sourced  materials.  Except  for  steel  products 
which  are  also  an  important  input  in  deep  mining,  the  increasing  prices  of  fuel  and  oil 













Room/Pillar 5-8 0-2 0 24-35 10-18 28-39 8-13
Longwalling 5-10 0-2 0 24-35 10-18 28-45 4-8
Dragline 14-18 15-20 5-10 22-28 5-12 18-32 1-4
Truck/Shovel 18-26 17-22 8-12 19-26 0-3 18-35 1-411 
 
Table 3: Average FOB costs in USD/t and export capacity (adjusted to 25.1 MJ/kg) 
 
Source: own calculations/EWI coal market database; export capacity data based on Kopal (2007), Rademacher 
(2008) and Bayer et al. (2009) 
 
Steam coal export capacity increased by about 12% between 2006 and 2008 (table 3). In the 
Pacific basin much of the growth came from Indonesia and Australia expanding their supply 
capacity. In the Atlantic market Colombia increased its export capacity by about 25 mt and 
became the largest steam coal exporter in the Atlantic market in 2008. Export capacity data 
was primarily derived from Kopal (2007), Rademacher (2008) and Bayer et al. (2009) and 
adjusted for energy content. 
 
4.2 Transport costs, port handling fees and seaborne freight rates 
Inland transport costs depend on the transportation mode and the distance from the coal fields 
to the export terminal. Coal is mainly hauled by rail or truck and in some cases by river barge. 
Inland transport costs vary between the mining regions. While they are below 4 USD/t for the 
bulk of the Colombian production they may be as high as 25 USD/t for the transport from the 
Russian Kuzbass basin to the Baltic ports. We estimated the relative impact of diesel fuel and 
electricity cost escalation by the relative importance of truck and railway haulage for main 
transport routes. Port handling fees comprise costs for unloading, storage and loading onto 
vessels. Country specific average inland transport cost and port handling fees are added to the 
mining cost curve to derive FOB supply functions. Seaborne bulk carrier freight rates are a 
Average costs Export capacity
2006 2008 cost increase 2006 2008 capacity increase
Indonesia 33 44 33% 154 197 28%
Colombia 31 42 34% 59 74 25%
China (Shanxi) 34 44 30% 62 45 -27%
USA (Central Appalachia) 46 57 23% 25 31 25%
Venezuela 32 38 19% 9 9 0%
Vietnam 29 38 32% 27 22 -18%
Spitsbergen 41 52 26% 2 4 67%
Queensland/open cast 33 41 24% 33 37 13%
Queensland/underground 33 37 14% 8 8 5%
New South Wales/open cast 34 42 23% 52 59 12%
New South Wales/underground 34 41 21% 27 31 15%
South Africa/open cast 28 36 28% 45 46 4%
South Africa/underground 32 41 25% 24 25 5%
Russia (Baltic) 48 64 34% 61 69 14%
Russia (Pacific) 40 48 19% 15 19 22%
Poland 58 79 36% 8 5 -38%
Total 611 681 12%12 
 
major  cost  component  of  internationally  traded  steam  coal.  For  determining  seaborne 
transport costs we use logarithmic freight cost functions based on distance which is regressed 
against  a  dataset  of  freight  cost  observations  for  both  model  years.  We  use  these  cost 
functions to determine consistent freight rates for every possible shipping route in the model. 
 
4.3 Demand data 
As described in Section 3 we assume linear steam coal demand functions for all importing 
regions  based  on  reference  quantities  and  prices  as  well  as  elasticities  (see  table  4  for 
reference volumes).
17 A general shortcoming of the literature on market conduct in global 
steam coal trade is the treatment of the demand side. Usually, assumptions on elasticities are 
drawn from empirical analyses found in the literature and subsequently elasticity sensitivities 
are  computed.
18  This  paper  presents  an  elasticity  analysis  for  Europe,  the  largest  import 
demand region on the maritime market. Demand elasticities for other regions are based on an 
extensive literature review.  
Table 4: Steam coal reference demand in million tonnes adjusted to 25.1 MJ/kg 
 
Source: IEA (2008, 2010); Ritschel (2007, 2009) 
 
Several  econometric  analyses  on  short  run  steam  coal  demand  elasticities  and  interfuel 
substitution have so far been published (see table 5 for an overview of the most important 
articles). Empirically estimated elasticities fall in range from -0.05 to -0.57. Although, the 
analyses  differ  in  terms  regional  coverage,  timeframe  and  methodological  approach  all 
authors find that price elasticity of steam coal is inelastic (|Elasticity| < 1).  
                                                 
17 Reference quantities are based on Ritschel (2007, 2010) and IEA (2007, 2010). We used the MCIS steam coal 
markers as reference price data in the model. 
18 See e.g. Haftendorn and Holz (2010) who choose elasticities during the calibration process based on Dahl 
(1993) or Graham et al. (1999) who test for several elasticities figures. Kolstad and Abbey assume demand 
elasticities of -0.6 for all regions. 
Europe Japan India Latin America China Taiwan Korea North America South East Asia
2006 187 110 26 9 46 60 62 42 29
2008 184 118 35 16 46 60 72 38 3613 
 
Table 5: Overview of short run coal demand elasticities in the literature 
 
 
Short run steam coal demand elasticity depends on various factors such as the power plant 
mix, the price of alternative fuels (particularly natural gas and in some regions fuel oil), the 
price of emission certificates, and total electricity demand to name but a few. Since these 
factors vary over time it is likely that some of the figures presented in table 5 are outdated 
today.  
We therefore conduct a steam coal demand analysis for Europe using the dispatch module of 
DIME (Dispatch and Investment Model for Electricity markets in Europe). DIME is large-
scale  linear  optimisation  model  for  the  European  electricity  market  that  simulates  hourly 
dispatch  taking  account  of  conventional  and  renewable  generation  technologies.
19  We 
calibrate the model with actual data for the  years 2006 and 2008 including the European 
power plant fleet, gas, fuel oil and CO2 emission prices as well as country-specific load data. 
Then, we iteratively test a high number of (equidistant) steam coal price points. The model 
computes the cost-minimal power plant dispatch and steam coal consumption subject to the 
coal price. Subsequently, we fit a linear function to the data using OLS from which we derive 
the elasticity at the reference point. Steam coal demand elasticity for the European electricity 
sector is estimated to be -0.12 in 2006 and -0.43 in 2008. The difference between these two 
figures stems from the varying gas and CO2 emission prices and thus their impact on the clean 
dark spread in the reference point.
20 During 2006 the clean dark spread was favourable for 
coal fired power plants whereas in 2008, with an increasing emissions price and a similar gas 
price as in 2006 the clean dark spread decreased. Hence, around the reference point (high coal 
price in 2008; low coal price in 2006) the elasticity was higher in 2008 as in 2006.  
                                                 
19 See Bartels (2009). For applications of this model see e.g. Paulus and Borggrefe (2010) or Nagl et al. (2011).  
A detailed description can be obtained from www.ewi.uni-koeln.de. 
20 The clean dark spread is the margin that a coal fired power plant earns given a certain electricity, coal and 
emissions price. European gas spot market prices were 22 EUR/MWh in 2006 and 24 EUR/MWh in 2008 (APX, 
2010). CO2 emission prices were 17 EUR/tCO2 in 2006 and 22 EUR/tCO2 in 2008 (EEX, 2010). 
Article Methodology Time period Sector Region |Elasticity|
Dahl and Ko (1998) Panel data analysis 1991-1993 Electricity U.S. 0.16-0.26
Ko (1993) Time series analysis 1949-1991 Electricity U.S. 0.25
Kulshreshta and Parik (2000) Time series analysis 1970-1995 Electricity India 0.34
Söderholm (2001) Panel data analysis 1984-1994 Electricity Europe 0.05-0.29
Masih and Masih (1996) Time series analysis 1970-1992 all sectors China 0.25
Ball and Loncar (1991) Time series analysis 1978-1988 Electricity OECD 0.16
Chan and Lee (1997) Time series analysis 1953-1994 all sectors China 0.26-0.32
Ko and Dahl (2001) Panel data analysis 1993 Electricity U.S. 0.5714 
 
However, these results cannot be generalised for all demand regions since they depend on a 
number  of  factors  that  usually  differ  regionally.
21  In  this  paper  we  use  the  estimated 
elasticities  for  Europe  and  assume  a  steam  coal  demand  elasticity  of  -0.3  for  all  other 
importing regions for both years. This assumption is based on the above mentioned literature 
review. 
 
5.  Simulation design 
The focus of our analysis is on seaborne steam coal trade for which a spot market with several 
well  established  price  indices  exists.
22  Hence,  we  model  only  dedicated  export  mining 
capacity.
23  
The supply structure in the steam coal trade market is heterogeneous. It consists of large state-
run  mining  entities,  several  privately-owned  international  mining  companies  and  a  large 
number of small national players. Furthermore, production regions are widely dispersed over 
the globe and so far no formal cartel such as the OPEC has been established. Therefore, in one 
scenario we test for a competitively organised steam coal trade market. 
However, the majority of internationally traded coal is produced by only four countries with a 
primarily  export-oriented  mining  industry  and  a  favourable  cost  situation:  Indonesia, 
Australia, South Africa and Colombia. Indonesia has been a member of OPEC until 2008 
when its oil reserves were depleted. Within few years it has become the largest steam coal 
exporter (Indonesian coal exports grew by 45% between 2005 and 2008). The issue of mining 
concessions is government controlled and nowadays only granted to Indonesian companies.
24 
Hence, currently the majority of steam coal production and infrastructure is controlled by 
large Indonesian conglomerates or the government. International coal trade is an important 
national revenue earner, which may favour non-competitive behaviour on a government level. 
Australia,  Colombia  and  South  Africa  have  privately  owned  mining  industries
25  but  the 
crucial export terminals are controlled by consortia consisting of the major players in the 
                                                 
21 For instance regionally differing gas prices or the installed capacity, availability and efficiency of the fleet. In 
some regions the competing generating technology may not be gas fired plants. Decreasing or increasing 
electricity demand also has an impact on coal demand elasticity. Moreover, emissions trading systems are not 
implemented in all regions (the U.S. for example have no GHG emissions trading system but an NOx trading 
system). 
22 See Ekawan and Duchêne (2006). 
23 Export capacity data is based on Kopal (2007) and Rademacher (2008) but adjusted for energy content and in 
some cases downgraded if other sources suggested so. 
24 See Baruya (2009). 
25 Nevertheless between 65% and 95% of steam coal exports of South Africa, Colombia and Australia are 
controlled by six large multinational companies (Xstrata, AngloAmerican, BHP Billiton, Rio Tinto and 
Drummond). See Murray (2007) and Wacaster (2008). 15 
 
country.
26 Clearly, all of these countries have the potential to act strategically and can be 
interpreted as national oligopolists. 
Similar to Kolstad and Abbey (1984), we assume that individual producers act as price takers 
but  oligopolistic  rent  is  accrued  on  a  country  level  for  example  through  taxes,  royalties, 
quotas  or  collusive  port  throughput  agreements.  This  allows  us  to  use  aggregate  national 
supply functions.
27 The non-competitive scenario is designed as follows. Australia, Indonesia, 
Colombia and South Africa act as non-cooperative Cournot players. Additionally China is 
assumed to act as a Cournot player. China is the largest steam coal producer in the world and 
has  the  potential  to  influence  the  seaborne  market  significantly.  Chinese  politics  have 
intervened regularly in resource markets and have continuously reduced steam coal export 
quotas.
28  Russia,  USA,  Venezuela,  Vietnam,  Norway  and  Poland  act  as  price  takers  and 
constitute the competitive fringe. All of them have a mining industry that primarily serves the 




6.1 Simulation results for the year 2006 
Figure 2 depicts actual price data and simulated model prices for the perfectly competitive 
and the Cournot oligopoly scenario for four major importing regions.
29 Clearly, the marginal 
cost  based  price  matches  the  actual  import  price  in  Europe.  Actual  prices  were  however 
higher  than  marginal  costs  of  delivery  in  Japan,  Taiwan  and  South  Korea.  From  a  price 
perspective  the  hypothesis  of  Cournot-Nash  behaviour  can  be  rejected  since  oligopolistic 
prices exceed actual prices significantly in 2006. 
                                                 
26 BHP Billiton and AngloAmerican are major shareholders of the Newcastle Infrastructure Group which 
operates the Newcastle Coal Terminal the main export hub in New South Wales. The largest coal terminal in the 
world, Richards Bay (South Africa) is jointly owned by all major producers in the country amongst them: BHP 
Billiton, AngloAmerican and Xstrata. The main export terminal in Colombia, Puerto Drummond and Puerto 
Bolivar are owned by Drummond and a consortium consisting of Xstrata, BHP-Billiton and AngloAmerican 
respectively. Moreover, these companies are vertically integrated and also own and operate the domestic coal 
transport infrastructure (Baruya, 2007).  
27 Our Cournot model formulation can be interpreted as a quota system that restricts exports to the Cournot-Nash 
outcome. Other Cournot model formulations with taxes instead of quotas of course produce equivalent outcomes 
(see e.g. Kolstad and Abbey, 1984). 
28 Chinese coal policy shares some interesting similarities with its rare earths policy. Chinese government has 
introduced an export limit on coal and on rare earths and has repeatedly cut these limits (Sagawa/Koizumi, 2008; 
Hurst 2010). Moreover, it restructures and consolidates both its coal mining and its rare earths mining industries 
to gain more control (Peng, 2010; Hurst 2010). In the coal sector companies have to qualify as exporters. So far 
only state-run companies are eligible for export licences (Baruya, 2007). 
29 For reasons of consistency we use the McCloskey’s Asian marker, North West European marker, and Japanese 
marker for deliveries in the 90 days forward period. These markers are adjusted to 6000 kcal/kg and are a spot 
price indicator. 16 
 
Figure 2: Comparison of actual and simulated prices in 2006 
 
Source: own calculations/MCIS-steam coal marker prices 
 
Table  6  reports  actual  and  simulated  steam  coal  trade  volumes  between  exporting  and 
importing regions for the year 2006 in million tonnes. In comparison to the price analysis the 
picture is less clear-cut when the focus is on trade flows. In general, trade flows in the perfect 
competition setup fit the actual trade pattern better since total supply is too low in the non-
competitive  scenario.  Main  trade  relations  in  the  real  market  match  the  major 
importer/exporter relations in the perfectly competitive scenario well in the Atlantic market.
30  
This supports the hypothesis that the international steam coal trade market was, to a certain 
degree, subject to competitive market mechanisms in 2006. However, the actual trade pattern 
is more diversified than the competitive one, particularly in the Pacific basin.
31  
 
                                                 
30 In reality South Africa, Russia, the U.S. and Colombia are the main suppliers to Europe. Small high cost 
producers like Poland or Norway are located close to the European market and generally ship their product to 
Europe. The North American demand region procures most of its imported coals from Latin American suppliers. 
31 Several reasons may explain the deviations between the actual trade pattern and the competitive pattern. First, 
economies with a high import dependency like Taiwan, Japan or Korea may apply import diversification 
strategies for reasons of security of supply. This may also explain the slightly higher prices in the real market, 
since these economies would usually pay a premium for their import diversification. Second, calorific values are 
indeed the most important quality parameter and are accounted for in the analysis. However, the chemical 
composition of coals in regard to ash and sulphur content, moisture and volatile matter may be important 
efficiency determinants for power plants. Some power plants may be adjusted to a specific coal type or certain 
types of coal from different regions are often blended to optimise coal quality at the import terminal. Third, long-
term bilateral contracts are still quite common in international coal trade. Finally, statistical errors and 




































Actual Perfect competition Cournot oligopoly with fringe17 
 
Table 6: Comparison of actual and simulated trade flows in million tonnes (energy adjusted) 
 
Source: IEA Coal Information, own calculations. 
 
Although, the oligopolistic trade pattern differs substantially from the actual trade flows, it 
features  a  higher  degree  of  diversification.  This  diversification  of  exports  stems from the 
oligopolists’ profit maximisation: A Cournot player exports to a certain market until marginal 
revenue equals marginal costs there. With a high market share in a certain importing region 
perceived marginal revenue for the exporter is low thus making it profitable to diversify the 
export structure. This may  justify  trade with regions that would cost-wise not occur in a 
perfectly competitive market. 
Especially,  major  players  in  the  pacific  basin  like  Australia,  Indonesia  and  China  have  a 
diversified supply structure in reality. Competitive behaviour would suggest that China ships 
all of its exports to Korea whereas in the actual market China trades the bulk of its exports 
with  three  Asian  economies:  Japan,  Taiwan  and  Korea.  Although,  Indonesia’s  supply 
South Africa Russia Venezuela Vietnam Indonesia Colombia China USA Australia Poland Norway
Actual 2006
Europe 56 59 2 1 17 28 3 6 3 8 2
North America 0 2 5 0 3 26 0 0 6
Latin America 2 0 1 0 2 3 0 0 1
China 0 1 0 22 14 0 1 0 8
Taiwan 0 2 0 0 29 0 16 0 13
Japan 0 9 0 3 23 0 16 0 60
Korea 0 3 0 1 20 0 17 0 20
India 3 0 0 0 17 0 5 0 2
South East Asia 1 2 0 0 24 0 2 0 0
Total 62 78 8 27 149 58 60 6 113 8 2
Perfect competition 2006
Europe 69 58 6 31 13 8 2




Japan 13 13 89
Korea 1 62
India 26
South East Asia 30
Total 69 71 9 27 154 59 62 13 103 8 2
Cournot oligopoly with fringe 2006
Europe 17 61 2 20 17 11 19 16 8 2
North America 6 6 7 7 4 7
Latin America 2 1 2 1 1 2
China 6 1 10 5 7 8
Taiwan 8 9 12 6 8 10
Japan 13 15 9 20 11 15 17
Korea 8 5 13 7 10 11
India 4 1 6 3 3 5
South East Asia 4 3 7 3 4 5
Total 68 76 8 27 95 59 62 19 81 8 2
Cournot oligopoly with fringe
Total seaborne trade 571 577 506
Actual Perfect Competition18 
 
structure is more diversified by nature due to its high production, the cost-minimal solution 
would imply that Taiwan procures all of its imports from Indonesia. Although Taiwan is a 
major importer of Indonesian coal it sources its imports from several exporters. In the non-
competitive market structure setup even high-cost fringe producers like the U.S. or Russia 
increase their market share. Since oligopolistic players withhold exports, prices rise and the 
fringe can capture rents by expanding its supply. 
The results for 2006 reveal a relatively high degree of competition particularly in the Atlantic 
market. In the Pacific market we note that prices exceed marginal costs of delivery and that 
the  actual  trade  pattern  is  more  diversified  than  the  competitive  one.  Clearly,  the  market 
outcome  is  not  fully  efficient  from  a  welfare  perspective  suggesting  that  some  non-
competitive  mechanisms  applied.  Further,  we  reject  our  non-competitive  oligopoly  with 
competitive fringe scenario. In this setup too much quantity is withheld and consequently 
prices are too high compared to actual data. However, in reality diversified export structures 
of major Pacific suppliers are observable. Since diversification also occurs in the Cournot 
scenario this may be interpreted as an indication for strategic behaviour.  
Haftendorn and Holz (2010) also find that prices deviate from marginal costs and real market 
trade flows are more diversified than in the competitive scenario. Our results are consistent 
with their conclusion that steam coal trade is better characterised by perfect competition than 
by a non-cooperative Cournot game in 2006.  
 
6.2 Simulation results for the year 2008 
Analysing the seaborne steam coal market in 2008 reveals a different picture. In 2008 steam 
coal import prices soared to very high levels of more than 140 USD/t on average in the core 
demand  regions  (see  figure  3).  Clearly,  by  comparing  competitive  (marginal  cost  based) 
prices of 2006 (see figure 2) with corresponding prices of 2008 (see figure 3), we see that 
marginal costs of supply increased significantly between 2006 and 2008, too. However, the 
cost increment is not high enough to cause price spikes as those seen in 2008. For example, 
import prices in Europe were 147 USD/t, while simulated marginal cost prices (including 
seaborne  freight  rates)  are  100  USD/t.  Consequently,  the  remaining  spread  of  47  USD/t 
between marginal costs and actual prices is too large to justify perfectly competitive conduct 
on the seaborne trade market in this year. However, we can also reject the hypothesis of the 
Cournot-Nash  oligopoly  with  competitive  fringe  in  this  market  from  a  price  perspective. 




Figure 3: Comparison of actual and simulated prices in 2008 
 
Source: own calculations/MCIS-steam coal marker prices 
 
With regard to trade patterns we observe that (as in 2006) certain competitive mechanisms 
seem  to  apply  (see  table  7).  Trade  relations  in  the  Atlantic  market  are  quite  accurately 
simulated in the competitive setup. The Colombian and the Russian export structures, both 
major suppliers for Europe, are still well approximated by the competitive model. However, 
the role of South Africa clearly changed. While South African exporters shipped 90% of their 
production to Europe this share has decreased to less than 70% in 2008. This shift of exports 
to  the  Pacific  basin  is  not  efficient.  The  competitive  scenario  shows  that  from  a  cost 
minimisation perspective South African  coals should be directed to the European market. 
Thus, in the real market South African exporters could accrue higher rents in the Pacific basin 
indicating that prices were inefficiently high in Asian import regions. 
Further, U.S. exports to Europe deviate significantly with the U.S. supplying about 15 mt 
more than in reality. The reason for this result may be the neglect of the U.S. domestic coal 
market in the model. Some of the export mining capacity attributed to the U.S. in the model 
normally serves the domestic market but generally has access to export infrastructure and the 
necessary coal quality to trade its product on the maritime market. However, exports depend 
not only on prices in the international market but also on domestic prices and contractual 









































Actual Perfect competition Cournot oligopoly with fringe20 
 
Table 7: Comparison of actual and simulated trade flows in million tonnes (energy adjusted) 
 
Source: IEA Coal Information, own calculations. 
 
Simulated trade flows are again more distorted in the Pacific market. In reality the three major 
players in the Asian market Australia, Indonesia and China decide on a trade pattern that 
deviates significantly from the welfare efficient solution. Although the trade pattern of 2006 
already suggested this, the effects are more pronounced in 2008. In the light of competitive 
prices that are considerably lower than actual prices, the hypothesis of perfect competition on 
the seaborne market is highly arguable in 2008. 
Moreover, in 2008 the efficient equilibrium quantity of 677 mt was not supplied. Instead, total 
trade volume stood at 606 mt implying that not all available supply capacity was in operation. 
There are in fact a number of possibilities why export capacity may have been scarce during 
2008.
32 Although such short-run bottlenecks are hard to quantify it seems unlikely that they 
                                                 
32 The national market in the USA may have had an impact on exports due to contractual obligations or high 
demand. U.S. exports remained under their nominal capacity potential. Secondly, some export collieries may not 
South Africa Russia Venezuela Vietnam Indonesia Colombia China USA Australia Poland Norway
Actual trade flows 2008
Europe 44 64 3 1 14 32 2 15 2 3 3
North America 1 0 2 0 2 31 0 0 1
Latin America 2 1 1 0 1 8 0 1 1
China 1 0 19 25 0 0 0 1
Taiwan 1 0 29 0 11 0 19
Japan 1 11 0 2 27 0 11 0 67
Korea 1 9 0 1 26 0 16 0 19
India 12 0 0 22 0 1 0 1
South East Asia 2 0 0 26 2 1 0 5
Total 64 87 6 23 172 73 42 16 116 3 3
Perfect competition 2008
Europe 72 69 25 31 5 4
North America 5 37




Korea 19 17 45
India 38
South East Asia 41
Total 72 88 8 22 192 74 45 31 135 5 4
Cournot oligopoly with fringe 2008
Europe 20 69 31 24 3 28 5
North America 4 5 7 6 2 5 7
Latin America 2 3 3 2 1 3
China 6 5 11 5 5 10
Taiwan 7 13 13 7 6 11
Japan 13 5 23 13 12 26 22
Korea 9 13 15 8 9 14
India 5 8 4 3 7 4
South East Asia 5 4 9 4 4 8
Total 72 88 9 22 119 74 45 31 109 5 4
Cournot oligopoly with fringe
Total seaborne trade 606 677 577
Actual Perfect Competition21 
 
add  up  to  more  than  70  mt.  Yet,  steam  coal  allocation  also  does  not  appear  to  be  non-
competitive in terms of the selected non-competitive setup of Cournot behaviour. As in 2006, 
the diversified supply structure in the Cournot setup has some appeal, but total traded volumes 
are again too low and simulated prices too high.  
 
7. Conclusions 
In  this  paper  we  analysed  the  allocation  and  pricing  of  steam  coal  in  the  seaborne  trade 
market. We demonstrated that competitive models are not able to fully reproduce real market 
equilibria especially in 2008. Although some competitive mechanisms seem to have applied 
particularly in the Atlantic region, seaborne steam coal trade is not fully efficient from a 
welfare  perspective.  Market  inefficiencies  are  more  pronounced  in  2008  especially  in  the 
Pacific region, indicating that competition may have been relaxed in this market in recent 
years. Our results for the year 2006 are qualitatively consistent with Haftendorn and Holz 
(2010) who also find deviations from the competitive solution. They conclude that the market 
is generally competitive and suggest that deviations are due to spatial price discrimination or 
the pricing-in of capacity constraints. However, prices increased significantly after 2006 and 
remained relatively high. Since then, the market behaviour of several major Pacific players 
may have changed. It is therefore important to investigate a year with high prices and look at 
total market volume. By analysing the year 2008 we draw a different conclusion. Our results 
show that the spread between marginal costs and prices increased in the analysed period and 
capacity utilisation decreased. Supply capacity analyses by Kopal (2007), Rademacher (2008) 
and Bayer et al. (2009) demonstrate that substantial capacity expansion projects came on-line 
in 2007 and 2008. According to our analysis, total (nominal) supply capacity would have been 
sufficient to serve demand in 2008 without rationing.
33 Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis 
of non-competitive conduct. 
Yet, the results of our oligopoly setup with major suppliers competing in quantities and facing 
a price-taking fringe do not present evidence for such a market structure to prevail in reality. 
                                                                                                                                                         
have reached full production capacity due to strikes and bad weather conditions (see Ritschel, 2009 and Xstrata 
Annual Report, 2008). Thirdly, interactions between the thermal coal market and the coking coal market may 
have had an impact. As a small proportion of a specific steam coal quality may also be upgraded to low quality 
metallurgical coal by washing. The boom on global steel markets in 2008 may have forced some steel mills to 
use coals which would otherwise have served as thermal coal. 
33 Short term supply bottlenecks may have been responsible for the low utilisation of (nominal) capacity to some 
degree and may have contributed to the high prices. However, to our best knowledge there is so far no 
quantitative evidence to what extend such bottlenecks occurred in 2008 and it is unlikely that short term 
constraints have persisted over several years. 22 
 
Anyhow, the export patterns of oligopolistic players in this scenario demonstrate that Cournot 
behaviour may generally be an explanation for the diversified steam coal allocation in reality. 
In the context of the structural changes, the importance of coal in energy supply and the 
inability  of  competitive  models  to  reproduce  recent  market  equilibria,  further  research  on 
steam coal market economics may be interesting. We suggest that future research focuses on 
other non-competitive pricing strategies such as spatial price discrimination and limit pricing 
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